The raid on the Camp Bastion base by the Taliban last Friday was on every level a highly successful enemy operation, even given the fact that the U.S. and NATO defenders killed at least 14 of the attackers, perhaps wiping out their entire force.
After all, the destruction of six U.S. Harrier jump-jets and the killing of a U.S. Marine lieutenant colonel in charge of a Harrier squadron represent a level of achievement that would have pleased U.S. or British commandos in World War II.
But the raid may be more significant because of the skill and planning it required — skill and planning far beyond the reach of most of the guerilla bands that are loosely termed the Taliban. Even the most experienced and best funded of our opponents in Afghanistan, such as the Pakistani-sponsored Haqqani network, would presumably have great difficulty in pulling off such an operation without considerable assistance.
It seems likely that the special forces of a professional army planned the raid, and trained, advised, and led the raiders — that is if they did not actually take part in it. Those special forces would, of course, be those of Pakistan.